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Abstract 
In new institutionalists’ analysis, the transaction costs are essential in explaining the origin of private 
property; however, this aspect is not that obvious in old institutionalists’ works. But even if they did not 
emphasize on this issue, they created a theoretical-explanatory background used and enriched with logical 
arguments and numerous examples by the new institutionalists in order to point out that it is not possible to 
explain the origin of property rights without taking into account the transaction costs theory. 
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A topic such as the origin of property could not have been overlooked by institutionalists. Indeed, neither 
the old nor the new institutionalists have avoided it.  
Let  us  take  the  example  of  Veblen,  from  among  the  old  generation  of  institutionalists.  He  was  first 
concerned with what others wrote on this subject, and he remarked: “In the accepted economic theories the 
ground of ownership is commonly conceived to be the productive labor of the owner.” (Veblen, 1898-9, p. 
1). “Some writers who have taken up the question from the ethnological side hold that the institution is to 
be traced to the customary use of weapons and ornaments by individuals. Others have found its origin in 
the social group's occupation of a given piece of land, which it held forcibly against intruders, and which it 
came in this way to own” (Veblen, 1898-9, p. 2). Highlights in the text are ours, and we use them to mark 
the key points that Veblen started from, and according to which he is willing to argue. He was familiar 
with  the  main  “sources”  of  property  from  anthropological  research:  work  as  such,  armed  violence, 
occupation of a plot of land, followed by its defence etc. Each of these possibilities to gain ownership 
rights as possession implied the consumption of energy, a cost. Veblen does not seem willing to make 
comments in this direction. Moreover, faithful to his general philosophy, he does not share the idea of work 
as a source of property. The general view that an institution is, essentially, a cultural fact, a shared belief, is 
applied in the case of property as well. Therefore, he writes that “ownership is not a simple and instinctive 
notion that is naively included under the notion of productive effort on the one hand, nor under that of 
habitual use on the other. It is a conventional fact and has to be learned; it is a cultural fact which has 
grown into an institution in the past through a long course of habituation, and which is transmitted from 
generation to generation as all cultural facts are” (Veblen, 1898-9, p. 5). As a supporter of such a point of 
view,  Veblen  does  not  stand  in  the  same  line  as  the  institutionalists  who  explain  the  emergence  and 
function of property rights starting, essentially, from transaction costs. Commons and Mitchell will not 
steer away from this stand. 
As far as new institutionalists are concerned, they start off by acknowledging Marx’s merit to have been 
“... the first to have stated that the specificity of ownership rights can be explained as a response to social 
problems due to deprivations and that the structure of ownership rights affects economic behaviour in 
specific and predictable ways” (Pejovich, 1982, p. 383-384). Once this issue has been established, they 
build a theory of property rights that can be situated on two levels: one of them is the level of naive theory, 
and it concerns the emergence of property rights in State and non-State societies; the other is the level of 
the modern theory of property rights. For the purpose of this article, we are interested in the first level. We   365 
wish to find out what neo-institutionalists think about the origin of property rights and how they have 
influenced the transaction costs of this phenomenon. 
The  grounds  of  the  naive  theory  of  property  rights  are  laid  by  Demsetz  (1967),  Mc  Manus  (1972), 
Anderson and Hill (1975), North and Thomas (1977). If Marx analysed the phenomenon of “primitive 
accumulation” with direct reference to the emergence and development of property in its capitalist form, 
Demsetz and the other new institutionalists set the original time frame even further back into time: they go 
as far as approx. 8-10 thousands years. Across such a time span, they are preoccupied with how property 
rights emerged and what costs this phenomenon involved. They are convinced that throughout this process, 
the State had a major role. What is more, they think that “... a theory of property rights cannot be truly 
complete without a theory of the State” (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972, p. 1140). This explains why R. Coase 
and D. North emerge as two  representative figures of the “Property Law School” – Virginia USA –, a 
school  that  grounds  the  emergence  of  the  State,  of  law  and  of  property,  as  a  process  of  “social 
effectiveness”; this is a process based on which a social contract is conceived so as to make  cost savings 
and to find a rule, an institution that, irrespective of whether it is called market, State or property, must 
allow  the passage  from a chaotic, collective and inefficient exploitation,  to one of clearly determined 
responsibilities and limits that also generate motivation and, consequently, that allow the efficient use of 
resources. Within such logics stands the approach of the first neo-institutionalists who tried to understand 
the origins of property in their connection with the necessary reduction of costs. 
The  works  of  the  above  mentioned  institutionalists  reference  concrete  examples  in  the  history  of  the 
emergence of private property; Indian castor hunters in Western Canada, farmers and cattle growers in the 
West American fields, fishing in the waters of the global ocean etc. Their writings lead to the conclusion 
that the first form of exploitation of any resource was common ownership. The passage from common to 
private ownership did not manifest itself as a bloody, “primitive” and gross process, in the Marxist version, 
but as a process in which hedonistic calculation played an essential role. As long as land or wild animals 
were  plenty  and  enjoying  full  freedom,  their  value  equalled  zero.  With  the  introduction  of  exclusive 
property rights, the value of these first primordial resources became positive. The appropriation process 
occurred in two forms. In pre-State phases there occurred a self-attribution of exclusive rights. Once 
States were formed, a process of ownership establishment was registered. In this latter case, the State is 
the master and the warrantor of common property. Yet in both cases, the passage from common to private 
is determined by similar reasons. The forceful idea and the common denominator of all arguments is that 
the  acquisition  of  exclusive  rights  occurs  only  when  potential  future  owners  expect  net  gains  from 
exclusivity. 
In pre-State times, studied by North, Gluckman (1956), Bates (1983), Umbeck (1978) and others, it seems 
that force, violence and coercion were major players in determining the limits of property. Whether land, 
gold mines, or fish lakes were concerned, the avoidance of chaos in exploiting these resources depended on 
the force mechanism between potential owners; the mechanism translated in a kind of contract via which a 
principle was acknowledged and respected, according to which each individual’s acknowledged wealth is 
the same that he would have gained by violence. In other words, the potential threat by force delimits 
things and establishes the proportions according to which goods are owned. Commenting on the writings of 
anthropologists that dealt with this subject, Thrainn Eggertsson concludes: “Violence takes the form of the 
use of work so as to exclude others from a piece of land. If two individuals of equal violent potential 
compete over a marginal piece of  land, then the person who is ready to allot more work hours to conquer it 
will obtain it” (Eggertsson, 1999, p. 310). What is at stake here, of course, is a “primitive cost”, as a sum 
of time and energy allotted to violence. Such costs determined the initial distribution, by self-attribution, of 
property rights; a distribution based on the power and status of individuals in the social group to which 
they belonged. What was acquired and gained by force had to be defended. Umbeck also considered the 
creation of some “revenge groups” that invite to non-aggression anyone who is tempted not to observe 
what  has  already  been  established.  Their  intervention  would  reduce  profits  expected  after  attacking  a 
certain property. Obviously, these groups, whose role was to “guard” property, involved some costs. The 
same  author  also  analyses  the  possibility  that  instead  of  counter-offensive  of  “pressure  groups,”  what 
should be effective was the fear of the misfortunes that a potential infringement of the rights of another 
person could bring about. Witchcraft or cursing function according to the same algorithm. To this we 
should add “compensation”, by virtue of which whoever has caused damages must cover them. All these 
actions are backed by customs, traditions, primitive “institutions”, initiated and accepted by the individuals 
of a human community. We can ask if under such circumstances, it was hedonist calculations or habits and   366 
customs  that  were  mainly  operative.  Karl  Polanyi,  for  instance,  doubts  the  capacity  of  individuals  in 
antiquity to calculate in terms of gains-losses, just like he finds it equally doubtful that exchange can shape 
society  and  bring  benefits.  “Contrary  to  what  Smith  believed,  writes  he,  the  inclination  to  make  an 
exchange with a view to obtaining gains is not natural. Numerous examples, passing through  ... the New 
Egyptian Empire... or Bergdamas in South-West Africa show that, as long as the market has not become a 
central institution of society, humans envisioned their life according to their social status and not according 
to  their  personal  economic  interest.  The  forces  that  acted  then  in  society  were  reciprocity  and 
redistribution. Reciprocity was ensured ... by the symmetry of primitive societies that guaranteed partners 
that exchanges should unfold on grounds of reciprocity. Redistribution was done via a central authority 
(total production was entrusted to the chief who performed redistribution among his subjects)” (Polanyi, 
1983, p. 2). 
Irrespective of whether habit, custom or rational calculation were primordial, one thing is certain: once a 
resource was taken in property (to be used, since buying and selling were not known yet) this very fact 
offered some extra motivation to the new owner. He was willing to consume time and energy, to resort to 
violence, to make friends or relatives etc. so as to defend his rights. Briefly, he was willing to support 
costs such as price of the quality of an owner. And nothing can explain that these costs were worth the 
trouble but the reason (that one was or not aware of) that what could be obtained by exploiting the property 
was worth the effort. The effort was fist consumed to make provisions against hunger and then to go 
beyond the stage of equal wealth  and reach differentiation; to obtain gains by exploiting the right of use, a 
primal form of property right. 
So, if violence, even in its brute form, is present in the new institutionalism’s explanatory environment, the 
picture that they depicted is different from Marx’s. Aggression means are not used until the moment when 
some  individuals  are  totally  deprived  of  their  goods  and  forced  to  sell  their  labour  force.  Genetic 
adaptation, as well as cultural adaptation, operated in each case. Each was given the chance to choose. The 
one who had chosen to spend more gained more. His consumption of energy, time, products, etc found 
their compensation. His property title had a price. He deserved to be paid because he had brought the 
chance of progress. 
It was not only the founders of the naive theory of property rights that dealt with pre-State times. Other 
economists  wondered  about  the  origins  of  property  too.  Hayek  is  one  of  them.  He  has  had  a  more 
significant contribution to the modern theory of property rights. Yet we mention him here as well because 
his perspective is interesting. He argues that “... the idea of individual property must have emerged at a 
very early stage, and that the first fabricated tools represent, perhaps, a good example” (Hayek, 1990, p. 
61 – our. emphasis). Therefore, not any kind of tools are linked with the origins of private property. It is 
only fabricated tools that can enjoy this status. The idea of work, of a cost incorporated in the fabricated 
goods, is implicit. Hayek does not stop here. He thinks that not only work, but skill also contributed to the 
division between common and private property. But, although work and skill have always been spoken 
about, more or less deftly, the concept of property does not go back that late in time. “Such a concept, he 
argues, could not have had too much of a signification among the groups of hunters and fishermen among 
whom the discoverer of a source of food or of a good shelter was obliged to share his discovery with his 
fellows” (Hayek, 1990, p. 61). Some time had to pass until the idea of property gained meaning and that 
“fusion between the inventor and ‘the rightful owner’ was produced” (Hayek, 1990, p. 61), between the 
creator of a product and the one who remains its rightful owner. The appropriate time was needed for the 
passage from natural “tools” to man-made tools. And, once produced, they “were attached to their makers 
probably because they were the only ones who knew how to use them” (Veblen, 1898-9, p. 61). In other 
words, lack of skill was taxed. Here lies the seed of a modern idea; production factors move on the market 
before they reach the hands or the minds that best know how to use them. Indirectly and deeply, Hayek 
talks about a cost: the cost of “skilful” use, of maximal efficiency of that which constitutes the body of 
individual property. In the same line of though but at its other end, present day liberals will argue that 
“property does not mean ‘the right to do what you want with what you have’ but the right to decide freely 
on how to use resources on condition that, by so doing, the similar rights of others are not infringed upon” 
(Lepage, 1989, p. 324). Infringing upon the rights of others does not necessarily mean plunder, theft or 
trespassing but also the inefficient, “unskilled” use, of the goods that one owns. 
What happens, though, in the age of the State, where the State is invested, at least initially, with the 
prerogative to administer and take responsibility for the management of common goods? The passage from   367 
common to private property is done here with the “consent” and support of the State; or outside the State, 
and in this case a cost of exclusion is present. The circumstances that determine it vary. 
Delimitation and application activities, such as putting up fences, building a dam, introducing and using 
barbed wire, lockets, alarm systems or watchdogs have mostly attracted attention. The achievement of 
“local voluntary agreements and of some extra-legal institutions” (Anderson&Hill, 1975, p. 169) out of the 
need  to  face  a  high  rate  of  criminality  and  abuses  of  all  sorts  also  meant  costs.  The  first  economic 
revolution, the passage from hunting and fishing to agriculture supposed costs as well. Determined as it 
was by the pressure of an increasing population and, therefore, by the need to obtain extra food, the new 
occupation, agriculture, although based on exclusively common ownership of land, led to compulsory 
expenses; to costs for the learning of the new “trade,” for the acquisition of new knowledge and techniques 
(North & Thomas, 1977, p. 240-241). 
New costs have also emerged as a result of a cumulative process of training by passing from common to 
private ownership. Communities’ attempt to maximise wealth found their solution in the passage from 
common property rights to individual property rights. The latter proved to bring supplementary profits to 
their owners, and this was enough reason to delimit plots and establish boundaries. Exclusion, made out of 
reasons of efficiency and in order to prevent theft of harvest increases the value of land. A higher value 
means, implicitly, the increase of the exclusion profit as well as of the temptation to trespass property. 
Increasing theft and abuses increase future delimitation and application costs, and so on. 
In all these circumstances individuals can use, or not, the State to their advantage and interest. Usually, the 
appeal to the State aims to adopt rules, when local and community rules are not enough to ensure the firm 
enforcement of property rights. 
R. Coase, in his celebrated article The Problem of Social Cost (1960), offers an example of State-private 
arbitrage and of the emergence of some exclusion costs. His work has remained special for our topic and 
also because in the process of exclusion he introduces a new variable – the effect de externality. The 
example offered by him, of the two neighbors of whom is a farmer and the other is a cattle-raiser, has 
remained a classic. In this example, starting from the hypothesis that the two plots of land are not enclosed, 
the cattle of the cattle-raiser can enter the farmer’s land. Hence, a negative externality via the damage 
caused. Without resorting to the State’s arbitrage, the two neighbors will look for a solution that would 
eliminate their conflicting situation. The nature as such of the solution depends on the existence or non-
existence of property rights. A first option is that in which the farmer is the owner of exclusive rights, well-
defined. In such a case, the cattle-raiser is obliged by law to pay damages. In order to avoid this situation 
he will take the initiative to enclose the land of his neighbour. The cost of the fence is an opportunity cost. 
It will be supported since it is smaller than the “fine” for trespassing. When the farmer does not have 
exclusiveness ensured by property rights, the relationship between the two changes. The cattle-raiser has a  
”right of free use” of his neighbour’s land, since it is not the object of a clearly defined property. The 
initiative of the solution comes, this time, from the farmer. He will be interested to “regain” his right of 
use. Therefore, he will fence the tract of land on his own expense. 
In either case, exclusivity, even as right of use, has a cost, that is covered as long as benefits obtained after 
gaining exclusive rights will be bigger. 
Coase’s “theory” functions under the circumstances where there is the possibility of a negotiation. In other 
words,  it  functions  when  there  is  a  market  on  which  costs  connected  to  information,  monitoring, 
negotiation and application of the agreement or of the contract can be noticed and quantified. It is possible 
however that the place and role of the market to be taken over by the State. Just like transactions and the 
acquiring  of  exclusivity  on  the  market  imply  costs,  similarly  “...But  the  governmental  administrative 
machine is not itself costless. It can, in fact, on occasion be extremely costly” (Coase, 1960,  p. 9), warns 
the same Coase. Yet he is not the only one who warns against the fact that State patronage in the exclusion 
process is not for free. Libecap and Johnson (1979, p. 137) highlight the costs engaged by the criminal 
character of some transfers under State patronage even. What they have in mind is the bribe paid to public 
officers  who  are  authorised  to  deal  with  such  issues  as  de  transaction  cost,  data  gathering  and 
“investigation” of the problem; fees for free access to a source etc. Thrainn Eggertsson reminds us the 
significant example that 289 days were necessary in a bureaucratic process to obtain from the State the 
necessary approvals to set up a clothing factory in Peru in the fist half of the 20th century and 200 stages to 
go through, take would take at least 7 years, in order to obtain the necessary licences to buy plots owned by 
the government that had never been private property (Libecap & Johnson, 1979, p. 293). It is precisely   368 
excessive bureaucracy and costs, occasioned by faulty, inquisitorial management, that damaged not just the 
individual’s pocket but also his health, entitled some persons to believe and to write that in many places, 
the Mafia is more productive than the State. 
What needs to be remembered is that also, in the case of the State as an “organiser of exclusive rights 
bidding”, what is always aimed for is hedonist balance; one calculates if net profits obtained after the 
acquisition of exclusive rights are higher than transactional costs. If the terms of this equation are reversed, 
the “privatisation” process does not take place. It stops or the goods simply return to the common property 
fund. There are quite few examples of non-attractive resources to be the object of exclusive rights in 
individual  property.  Hard  to  delimit  and  apply,  exclusive  fishing  rights  in  the  planetary  ocean  have 
featured, for instance, this specificity. The true owners have remained the national States; it was only the 
temporary use and exploitation that have made the object of exclusion. Anyway, it is well known that a 
rule did not exist back then, in the “primitive” or naïve stage of the emergence of property rights, just like 
it does not  exist today, a rule that should establish fixed norms according to which a resource or a good 
must  pass from common to private ownership. It is generally acknowledged that the cost-benefits balance, 
even in its naïve form, operated then just like, given the necessary exceptions, it operates even today. The 
Eiffel Tour is an exceptional example. 
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